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I. Background and Objectives
The World Bank suggests a weather index based insurance scheme is superior. The
World Bank’s stance on an agricultural insurance scheme is as follows (World Bank, 2008,
p.149):? “The track record of agricultural insurance directly supplied by governments is not
encouraging. In Brazil, costs exceeded premiums by more than 300 percent. …..One 
innovation that might do so is insurance indexed to an objective indicator of weather, such 
as rainfall or temperature. …..Because weather is not affected by individual behavior, 
indexed insurance can address both monitoring costs and moral hazard.” World Bank is
afraid of the governance failure and tries to widely introduce the agricultural insurance 
without touching the fundamental and necessary governance improvement. In fact, almost 
all developing countries confront critical constraints of governance. World Bank seems to 
promote the agricultural insurance scheme without improving relevant institutions as well 
as governance in developing countries. What about Japan in monsoon Asia? Japan has had 
an agricultural insurance scheme since 1947, but a weather index scheme has not been 
applied.
Many monsoon Asian countries, mainly ASEAN countries, are growing to middle 
income countries where “middle income trap” becomes serious. In those countries, 
improving the economic efficiency through institutional and organizational reform and 
improving governance are urgent and critical issues. In the case of establishing agricultural 
insurance scheme, there is no reason to avoid institutional and organizational reform and 
upgrading of governance. As soon, such new scheme or project must be utilized to be a 
means of improving institutions, organizations and governance. In this sense the 
experiences of AMR (Agricultural Mutual Relief, known in Japanese as NOSAI) Scheme in 
Japan is noticeable. The AMR Scheme is architected based on the well-designed
institutions and organizations with good governance of farmers’ associations and 
governments although it is supported by large government expenses. As climate is the most 
influential factor on the risk of agricultural production, in this sense also, the case of Japan 
included in monsoon Asia should be worthwhile to be reviewed.
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Because of concerns regarding climate change, many arguments on “agricultural 
insurance” are centered on protecting farmers from natural disasters and food security
without increasing government expenses. On the other hand, the World Bank has focused 
on the issue of bringing agriculture to the market in its World Bank Development Report 
(WDR) (World Bank, 2008). Chapter 5, titled “Bringing agriculture to the market,” pointed 
out the following roles of insurance (World Bank, 2008, pp.118-137): improving 
commodity trading and risk management, maintaining international competitiveness,
linking producers to modern supply chains, meeting product standards for export, and 
agribusiness development. In Chapter 6, on insurance to manage risk as an institutional 
innovation, WDR pointed out that “in addition to enhancing the supply of agricultural 
credit, insurance can make potential borrowers more willing to bear the risk of conventional 
collateralized loans. As always, there is a tradeoff. Insurance is costly and leads to higher 
overall costs when added on to a loan.” (World Bank, 2008, p.148). According to the 
studies of our colleagues in Indonesia, business development has been constrained due to 
the lack of insurance. In various cases, technical innovation was not sustained due to the 
lack of agri-business support (see, for example, Indri and Ishii, 2017; Dian, Yonekura, and 
Takashino, 2013).
Recently, in Japan, the insurance is being reformed to income insurance as part of the
progress of commercialization and globalization. In the era of commercialization and 
globalization of agriculture, although food security is essential, so is sustainable 
agribusiness development.
This study’s goal is to cast a spotlight on the institutional and organizational
architecture and governance not only for continuously ensuring food security but also for 
facilitating access for farmers to the developing urban and overseas markets. Established in 
1947, the agricultural insurance scheme in Japan has a relatively long history. As it is 
backed up by the government, the budget burden is large and it does not have a good 
reputation from the World Bank’s point of view. As a persistent mechanism for reducing
moral hazard and adverse selection, however, the insurance scheme of Japan deserves to be 
recognized from the view point of business continuity as well as food security.
The objective of this study is to investigate how the AMR Scheme in Japan maintains
the insurance business, and encourages farmers move toward the scheme. In this study, 
farmers/villagers are regarded as critical human resources, and they need to be developed,
not as insurance clients, but as leading players/stakeholders for implementing the insurance 
scheme. This study reviews the NOSAI scheme’s principle, its organization and governance,
the way it assesses disaster damages, various options of insurance policies, and incentive 
design.
II. Architecture of the Agricultural Insurance Scheme in Japan (NOSAI )
It is certain that Japan’s agricultural insurance is not necessarily unusual (Table 1).
Many countries, mainly high-income countries, have subsidized insurance schemes for the 
agricultural sector. However, even relatively low-income countries like the Philippines also 
subsidize an agricultural insurance scheme. World Bank and FAO studied about the points 
of concern for the government support agricultural insurance in developing countries
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(World Bank 2010, FAO 2011). The basic feature of the agricultural insurance scheme of 
Japan is evaluated as follows: “Based on a spirit of mutual aid among farmers rooted in 
farming community, the government supports AMRAs (AMR Associations) and farmers as 
well as establishes the system or scheme based on partnership. This unique system of 
farmers’ participating in insurance successfully reduces transaction cost. Insurance and loss 
control are like the two wheels of a cart, being twin-engine for sustainable growth in the 
disaster crop insurance market. Additionally, loss control is not only a tool for saving 
insurance cost, but also for enforcing a cooperative relationship among famers in some 
cases.” (Okada, 2016).
The Agricultural Mutual Relief (AMR) Insurance Scheme lays the foundation for local 
farmers' cooperative actions to establish a joint reserve fund by accumulating contributions 
as premiums to make up farmers’ losses caused by natural disasters?. This is insurance 
operated by associations or municipal governments. Because agriculture is vulnerable by 
nature, the risk cannot be adequately dispersed within the limit of local communities or 
even prefectures. Therefore, this insurance program is operated as a device for dispersing 
risk, in which liabilities of the AMR Associations and the municipal governments are 
reinsured by their prefectural federation, and further, the federations' liabilities are 
re-reinsured by the central government. 
Since a legal body between the farmers and the central government is allowed to 
commit to the insurance scheme, any group of farmers without legal status cannot be 
insured. The intermediary business of (insurance) brokers is impossible. This eventually 
helps to avoid moral hazard and adverse selection. For rice, wheat and barley insurance, 
and livestock insurance, implementation of the scheme is compulsory for associations. 
Participation is compulsory for farmers who cultivate rice, wheat or barley over the 
Table 1. Availability of Crop and Livestock Insurance in Selected Economies
Country 
Subsidized Crops (peril) MPCI Revenue Live stock Index-based 
Austria x x Mortality
Canada x x ? ? X All risk Crops 
Cyprus x
Czech Republic  x Mortality 
France x x Mortality
Israel x Mortality 
Italy x x Mortality
Japan x  x All risk
Portugal x x
Slovenia x All risk 
South Korea x x Mortality 
Spain x x Mortality Crops 
Switzerland x x Mortality 
United States x x ? ? X Price/Margin Crops, rangeland 
Philippines x x ? Mortality     Crops
Source: Celia M. Reyes et al., 2017.
Note:  x means in point. MPCI: multi-peril crop insurance.
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specified area (Table 2). Half of the premium (in seasonal or annual payments) is 
subsidized by the government. The government also bears a part of the operational 
expenses of the organizations. The government (re-)reinsures for the indemnity payment of 
the scheme, excluding the farmer's house insurance.
The predominant features of the NOSAI Scheme of Japan are summarized as follows:
(1) Mutual relief system: committed by farmers themselves,
(2) Voluntary and compulsory participation: rice, wheat and barley insurance is 
compulsory for individual farmers and for AMR Associations for food security,
(3) Coverage: limited to production risk only, marketing and management risk are 
not insured,
(4) Coverage under the contract of agricultural insurance: about 60 % of agricultural 
outputs,
(5) Financial Performance: Sustainable base is maintained through subsidies by three 
areas of government,
(i) Subsidy of farmers’ premiums: 50% of the premium is subsidized;
(ii) Operational subsidies to insurers of AMR to cover the administrative costs 
associated with operation of the scheme; and
(iii) Reinsurance: 100% insurance liability is guaranteed through
(re-)reinsurance and AMRAs’ insurance.
This well-designed architecture, backed up by the reinsurance system, multi-stage 
assessment of claims, and a peer monitoring system among farmers, has encouraged
farmers’ participation and reduced moral hazard, adverse selection, and system loss.
An insurance policy is designed by considering the characteristics of risk of 
agricultural products, claim settlements, the intensity of clients’ commitment, and so on.
Damages in Japan are generally assessed in a manner of “insured perils.” Insured perils are
wind hazard, flood, drought, cool summer damage, snow disaster, other meteorological 
disasters (including earthquake, eruption, tsunami), fire, disease and insect damage, and 
damages by wild life (beasts and birds).
Table 2. Criteria of Compulsory Participation of the Scheme
Territory (by 
Prefecture)
Item of AMR Minimum area 
(ha)
Prefecture Paddy rice 0.2 ? 0.4
Upland rice, Wheat, Barley 0.1 ? 0.3
Hokkaido Paddy rice, Upland rice 0.3 ? 1.0
Wheat, Barley 0.4 ? 1.0
Source: MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) 
2017.
Note: Farmers who cultivate more than the minimum area are 
obligated to join the AMR Scheme. The minimum area is 
fixed by the governor of each prefecture.
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Insured perils are applied for paddy and upland rice, wheat, barley, upland crops?,
livestock?, and fruits?. Insured perils for fruit trees are comprised of rampike, washout, loss, 
laid and buried, depredation, and other damages caused by meteorological disasters.
Greenhouses include glass greenhouses, PVC greenhouses, and weather sheds (rain 
cover). Insured perils are wind hazard, flood, drought, cool summer damage, snow disaster, 
other meteorological disasters (including earthquake, eruption, tsunami), fire, 
burst/explosion, crash or minor collision of aircraft, fallen matters from aircraft, clash or 
minor collision of automobile/its loaded matter, pest and disease, and damages by beasts
and birds.
Characteristics of risks critically affect the architecture of the insurance scheme. In 
general, risks attack agricultural sectors in diversified ways, and cause different degrees of 
damages, and reduced yields. Risks are diversified per: (1) crop, (2) farm unit, block or 
limited territory, local area, nationwide etc., and (3) time/days, season, year, several years, 
etc. Claim settlements for crop insurance are, in general, comprised of Insured Perils, MPCI 
(multi-peril crop insurance: yield based), Crop Revenue, and Index based. Livestock 
insurance is comprised of various risks of accident and mortality, index based, and
epidemic disease. Claim settlements of damages and resolving indemnity are the key
components of insurance policies.
Delivery channels or, in other words, stakeholders, include, for example, (insurance)
brokers, stock agents and banks, cooperatives, and farmer's associations. Cooperatives tend
not to be necessarily elaborate but can be considered important delivery channels or
"insurance agents." The channels are unified through the AMR Associations/ Federations in
Japan.
Table 3. Agricultural Mutual Relief (AMR or NOSAI) Scheme in Japan
?
????
Insurance of Agricultural Mutual Relief (AMR) 
Associations
?????
Insurance of Agricultural 
Cooperative
Law
???????
the Agricultural Disaster Compensation Law (Law 
No.185 of 1947)
???????
the Agricultural Co-operative Law
Program
Rice, wheat and barley 
Livestock  
Fruits and their trees
Upland crops, Sericulture
Greenhouses
Houses (short-term: non-refundable), Equipment 
/Machines (short-term non-refundable or 
savings-type insurance)
Human life, Mobiles, Houses 
(long-term)
Participation
Rice and other grains: compulsory
Others: compulsory or voluntary
Voluntary
Government support for 
premium 40?55? None
Implementing Institution NOSAI (AMR Association) JA (Japan Agri. Cooperative)
Source: NOSAI home page, http://www.nosai-ngs.or.jp/kyosai/.
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The overall architecture of the AMR (NOSAI) Scheme is shown in Table 3. For 
reference, NOSAI is compared with JA Kyosai (Insurance of Agricultural Cooperative
Japan, see Box too).
III. Organization and Performance
An “agricultural insurance pool” could act as a risk aggregator, providing farmers and 
herders with affordable and effective agricultural insurance that is financially sustainable in 
the long term, without heavy public subsidies (Mahul and Stutley, 2010, p.163). The extent 
of the government burden mainly depends on the necessity of food security. In populous 
countries like many Asian countries including Japan, the extent could be inevitably greater
than in less populous or food grain export countries. Nevertheless, it is essential to pay 
meticulous attention to reducing the heavy public subsidies. The AMR Scheme in Japan 
mobilizes individual farmers and their associations and even local governments as players.
These players can manage their insurance from an ownership perspective. Through their
daily activities, they can mutually acquire insurance operation know-how and skills and, at 
the same time, they can deepen their understanding of the risks attached to their farm plots,
farm units, and the entire territory of the association. The players are mutually linked by the 
relief system. In this sense, the AMR Scheme seems to work as an “agricultural insurance 
pool,” which was pointed out by Mahul and Stutley (2010)?.
Figure 1 shows the organization of the AMR Scheme (Agricultural Mutual Relief:
NOSAI). The AMR Scheme is basically comprised of four levels, namely, (1) individual 
farmers (including groups qualified as members) or policy holders, (2) AMR Associations 
(AMRA) at the municipality level, (3) AMR Federations at the prefecture level, and (4) 
MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries).
The total number of individual members of the AMRs was approximately 1.55 million
in 2015 and there were 69 AMRAs. In addition to AMRAs, 42 municipality governments
(where no insurer AMRA is organized) joined the scheme. There are another 30 AMRAs 
(NOSAI Prefecture) at the prefecture level where one AMRA covers the entire territory of a 
prefecture, and directly works with the central government.
An AMR Federation is usually organized in each prefecture by the AMRAs and 
municipality governments. The 17 AMR Federations operate as reinsurers and work with 
the central government. NOSAI National works as the liaison and coordinator for the AMR 
Federations and AMRAs.
As of 2007, in terms of staff members, manpower for operating this scheme was: 
AMRAs, about 8 thousand; AMR Federations, about 1 thousand; and NOSAI National, 60 
Box: Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA) in brief
? JA Kyosai and NOSAI are different institutions.
? “JA group” includes administrative bodies that supervise regional co-ops across several prefectures, run 
wholesale businesses in food products and production inputs across municipal and prefectural borders 
(Zen-Noh), manage credit unions (Norinchukin Bank), offer insurance (JA Kyosai), and a national 
headquarters that controls the entire group and manages government relations (JA Zenchu).
－6－
Implication of the Agricultural Mutual Relief Insurance Scheme in Japan as 
for the Development of Agricultural Insurance in Monsoon Asian Countries 
 
 
 
staff members. Approximately 100 staff members oversee this scheme at the national level 
of the MAFF.
Recently, the size of this scheme in terms of insurance amount is approximately ¥2.8
Figure 2. Amount of Insurance Covered by the AMR Scheme
Source: MAFF 2017.
 
Figure 1. Organization of AMR (NOSAI: Agricultural Mutual Relief) Association Scheme
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trillion (Figure 2, ¥110?$1). This amount has tended to decrease due to the gradual 
diminution of the agricultural sector in the national economy of Japan. The largest share is 
rice, wheat, and barley (40 percent), followed by livestock (30 percent). This covers 
approximately 60 percent of the total value of agricultural products. The proportion of area 
under the insurance is more than 90 percent of farmers in the program for paddy rice, wheat, 
and barley (Table 4). The share of dairy cattle is also more than 90 percent in terms of 
head-count?.
Figure 3 shows the actual disbursement of indemnities during the quarter century since 
1990. In ordinary years, the amount of indemnities is less than 100 billion yen. The share of 
livestock is the highest among the five programs of insurance. In years of serious disasters,
like strong typhoons or cool weather, particularly during the summer season, damages have 
been extensive and intensive. Japan experienced three severe years during the last quarter 
century. In 1991, Japan was hit by a typhoon, and in 1993 and 2003, Japan experienced 
cool summers that caused large scale crop failures. The scheme seems to work effectively 
 
Figure 3. Disbursement of Indemnities 
Source: MAFF 2017.
Table 4. Coverage by Object in 2015 
(April-March)
Target Object Rate of insuring (%)
Paddy rice 92
Wheat and barley 98
Dairy cattle 93
Beef cattle 67
Fruits (harvesting) 24
Upland crops 70
Green house 47
Source: MAFF 2017.
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both in ordinary years and severe years.
In 1993, rice production decreased to approximately 70 percent of an ordinary year,
and suddenly about 2 million tons of rice were imported, an amount so large that it caused a
disturbance in the world rice market. Payment of the indemnities to rice, wheat, and barley,
mostly rice, amounted to more than 400 billion yen. The severe disasters seem to happen at
longer intervals. In 1994, just after the severe damage of 1993, the scheme members 
quickly recovered from the systemic shock. The scheme itself was maintained and quickly 
got back to its usual operations. Japan maintained the government supported insurance 
system for the agricultural sector to ensure sufficient measures for such heavy, large, and 
systemic risk.
IV. Insuring Method of Insurance Policies
The AMR Scheme has given as much thought to the content of insurance policies as to 
the architecture and organization of the scheme. As disasters attack in various ways by plot, 
unit of farming, territory, season, or years, there are various options for insurance policies 
through the Scheme. Farmers themselves consider their farming conditions, and select their 
insurance policy from various options. It is very helpful for farmers who seriously try to
mitigate the negative impact of disasters with cheaper premiums. In these days, income 
compensation to reduce the negative impact of globalization is being introduced, along with 
the development of bookkeeping and a tax collection system.
For rice, wheat and barley, there are four different insuring methods as shown by Table 
5 and Figure 4. Guaranteed yield level for paddy rice, for example, is varied from 50 
percent to 90 percent. Premium value is also different, in accordance with the guaranteed 
level. Farmers can select the best option considering their farming conditions and their own 
farm skill, etc. The premium is fixed by the association and authorized by the central 
government. Table 6 shows the farmers’ selections of insuring methods. In the case of rice, 
approximately 80 percent of farmers select the guarantee of yield by plot. “Unsyu orange” 
Table 5. Menu of Insuring Policy by Program
 
Program
Insuring Method
Rice,
wheat 
and 
barley
Fruits Upland Crops
(option by each crop)
e.g. 
Soybean
e.g. Sugar beet
Yield by Plot ○ ○ ○
Yield by Damaged Plots ○ ○ ○
Yield by All Plots of a 
Farm
○ ○ ○ ○
Decreased Farm Income ○ ○
Source: MAFF 2017.
Note: ○ means coverage.
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(the most popular orange in Japan) farmers select the guarantee of income by farm unit. 
However, apple farmers prefer the guarantee of yield by damaged plots. Upland crop 
farmers prefer the yield by all plots of a farm. Table 6 implies that farmers and AMRs 
consider various conditions and select the proper policies from the menu. 
 
 
Table 6. Preference of Insuring Method by Members 
(% : in 2015) 
 
 
Insuring Method 
Rice and other grains Fruits Upland Crops  
Paddy 
rice 
Wheat, 
barley 
Total “Unshyu 
orange” 
Apple Total e.g. 
Soybean 
Total 
Yield by Plot 79 7 68 - 11 10 15 6 
Yield by Damaged Plots 9 0 8 34 89 62 3 10 
Yield by All Plots of a Farm 9 10 9 0 - 2 83 84 
Income by Farm Unit 3 84 15 65 - 26 - 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: MAFF 2017. 
Note: Figures of % in this table are calculated on the basis of contract area. 
  
 
Figure 4. Assessment of Damage by Insuring Method: Example of A Farm with Three Plots 
Source: MAFF 2017. 
A Plot
Yield
no decrease
B Plot
Yield
decrease
C Plot
Yield
decrease
Field inspection on B
&C and measurement
each
By Plot
A Plot
Yield no
decrease
B Plot
Yield
decrease
C Plot
Yield
decrease
Assessment of yield
decrease based on the
shipping record
Damaged Farm Unit
A Plot
Yield no
decrease
B Plot
Yield
decrease
C Plot
Yield
decrease
Field inspection on B
&C and unitary
assessment
Damaged Plots
A Plot
Yield no
decrease
B Plot
Yield
decrease
C Plot
Yield
decrease
Assessment based on
the shipping record:
both decreased yield
and income
Decreased Farm Income
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In the AMR Scheme, just 50 percent up to 90 percent is insured, instead of the standard 
yield level. This is to give farmers the incentive for self-reliant effort and work, as a means 
of reducing moral hazard and adverse selection. Because of peer monitoring in the process 
of the assessment of damage, farmers can know each other’s standard level of yield rate. 
Farmers can understand each other’s farming skill level and diligence. Because of this, the 
decrease in yield and other impacts of disasters can be evaluated in detail and fairly.
The method of fixing indemnity is as follows. Let the indemnity by plot of paddy rice 
be as follows (see Figure 5):
Guaranteed level of crop failure: 70% of standard yield (other options: 60%, 50%),
Unit price of insurance ¥300/kg (fixed by insurance policy),
Standard-yield 500kg/10 are, and
Actual yield 300 kg.
Insured amount per 10 are is
¥300*500kg*0.7=¥105,000
and, as displayed in Figure 5, the farmer can receive indemnity
¥300*50kg=¥15,000 per 10 are. 
The premium is calculated using the formula of a unit value of insurance multiplied by the 
rate of premium. The rate of premium is updated every three years based on the damage 
rate during the last 20 years. The actual premium payment made by farmers is 50 percent of
the premium. The other 50 percent is subsidized by the government. If the rate of premium 
is 0.5 percent, the farmer pays
50% * 350kg*(¥300*0.5%)= ¥262.5/ 10 are.
The premium rate is fixed by each product item and by the unit of insuring based on
the frequency and degree of damages so that the insurance balance can be maintained in the 
Figure 5. Calculation of Indemnity: Paddy Rice by Plot
Source: MAFF 2017 and author’s processing.
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long run. The central government decides the base rate of premium by each AMRA 
(including municipalities). Each AMRA applies the premium rate to its members at not less 
than the base rate fixed by the central government. The premium rate applied to each 
member must in general be the same within an AMRA, but an AMRA is partially allowed 
to differentiate the rate by member considering damages. If a member’s total amount of 
paid premium is less than that of indemnity received for the last number of years, the
AMRA can refund a certain portion of paid premium to the member based on the AMRA’s
independent judgement (called “Bujimodoshi”).
The average premium payment placed burden on farmers can be estimated by the Loss 
Ratio (Indemnity/ Premium) and Damage Rate (Indemnity/ Insurance) in Appendix 2. The 
Damage Rate over the Loss Ratio which means the raito of premium payment over insured 
value was 3.5% (= 0.027/0.761=0.035) in 2015. As this year 2015 can be count as a regular
year in terms of production risks of agriculture (see Figure 3), the premium/ insurance 1.7%, 
namely actual premium payment rate taken over by farmers (50% of the premium is 
subsidized by the government) could be regarded as the affordable and willingness level of 
premium payment and as the sustainable level for maintaining the AMR. Considering the 
long and sustainable experience of the AMR Scheme in Japan, this average premium 
payment rate (or insurance rate) can be understood as the incentive level to make farmers 
continuously join the scheme and a useful reference value for designing insurance scheme 
and policy?.
V. Mechanism for Reducing Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection and Its Government Cost
The multilayered configuration comprised of the member farmers, local association/
municipality, federal association, and the central government allows repeated crosschecking 
of yield losses (Figure 6). The scheme covers the various product items but is limited to 
certain items that are measurable. Therefore, leaf vegetables, such as cabbages, spinaches 
etc., are not covered by the AMR Scheme. The coverage the AMR Scheme envisions is not 
that ambitious, but it covers approximately 60 percent of all agricultural products in Japan. 
Through the re-insurance system, the indemnity is shared by the AMRAs, the AMR 
Federations, and the central government. 
The central government expense for this scheme was about ¥88 billion in 2015. This 
was comprised of ¥50 billion for the governmental burden of premiums and ¥38 billion for 
subsidizing the operational cost of the AMRAs and Federations. The loss ratio on average 
was just under 1.0 (0.761 in 2015) and the damage rate was 2.7 percent in 2015 without any
heavy disasters (Appendices 1 and 2). Indemnity is financed by the premiums from 
members and the government. The residual (1-0.761=0.239) is mainly allocated to the 
account for the re-reinsurance fund of the central government and AMR Federations.
The AMR Scheme uses a practical method to ensure yield levels rather than yield loss.
Damage assessments and claim settlements are done at all three phases: the association, the 
federation, and the central government. In the case of insuring by plot, an initial assessment 
of damaged plots is done by a group of three association members, and then the association 
staff carries out a random sampling survey to clarify the report. The double assessment is 
done within an AMRA, as displayed in Figure 6. Without such voluntary peer monitoring, 
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the scheme would not be different from the regular insurance business. This is a very 
essential element of mutual relief.
The result authorized by the damage assessment committee of the association is 
reported to the federation level. The federation carries out a sampling survey again, based 
on the report from the individual association. After being authorized by the damage 
assessment committee of the federation, the result is reported to the central government. 
Based on the federation report, the central government reviews the damages and accredits 
the decreased yield. Mutual relief insurance, reinsurance, and re-reinsurance are 
implemented based on this accreditation. 
Monitoring, assessment, and claim procedures are executed on a routine basis, and this 
includes the frequent practices of the association staff, as well as member farmers. The 
standard yield, for example, can be correctly estimated and set using the multilayered 
system that begins with peer monitoring within the association. Various critical criteria and 
indicators, for example, the premium rate, are authorized by the Minister of the AFF, but 
many options and allowances are provided to AMR member farmers, associations, and 
federations to keep the scheme flexible.
This operation, however, has become difficult due to the depopulation and aging of 
farmers. Japan is already in the era of a population onus. The economically active 
population has decreased, and the agriculture sector’s share of employment has shrunk. The 
population of rural societies has also rapidly gotten smaller, and many rural communities 
are in the process of extinction.
The total number of AMRAs has declined. In 1947, the year the AMR Scheme was 
 
Figure 6. Settlement of Claim System
Source: NOSAI home page.
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established, there were 10,541 AMRAs and 46 AMR Federations. In 1965, 872 
municipalities were involved in the scheme. In 2016, there were only 69 AMRAs and 42 
municipalities. Recently, 30 AMR Prefectures were established to unify entire prefectures.
An AMR Prefecture can be operated like a Federation. Due to the depopulation of the rural 
society, merging AMRAs was inevitable for maintaining operations and improving 
efficiency. More recently, the depopulation of members makes it hard to maintain voluntary
damage assessments. Figure 7 shows the decreasing trend of the numbers of AMR 
members who undertake voluntary assessments. The available manpower for mutual 
assessment of damages is approximately 140 thousand members, which has gradually 
decreased over the last 30 years. This could cause vulnerability of the foundation of mutual 
relief and peer monitoring that has helped minimize moral hazard and adverse selection. 
In principle, the AMR Scheme member must be an individual farmer. AMRAs and 
AMR Federations/National must be legal bodies registered by the Legal Affairs Bureau. In 
addition to individual farmers, legal bodies of farmers’ groups are allowed to join the AMR
Scheme. A non-legal body can also join the scheme but it must be qualified. The essential
conditions as a member of the AMRA are as follows: (1) The group has a mandate and 
regulates the rules of premium payment and distribution of received indemnities; (2) All 
members of the group must live within the territory of the AMR association. (3) The 
program is open only to farmers of rice, wheat and barley, upland crops, and fruits. These 
conditions are very crucial to make clear the locus of responsibility and to avoid the 
diffusion of responsibility, particularly at times of damage and failure of the farm economy.
The total number of such qualified groups lately is approximately 5,500. 
Figure 7. Depopulation of Members for Damage Assessment
Source: MAFF 2017.
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A written code enables members and associations to reconcile disputes at the time of 
default. A simple voluntary farmers group without such a code cannot be involved in the 
scheme; this would make the enforcement of a debtor’s responsibility impossible. This rule 
is critical to keep the scheme’s accountability and responsibility, and to implement proper 
management with mutual reliance. This legally enhanced system has enabled the AMR 
Scheme in Japan to maintain sustainable operations for 70 years.
To access developing agricultural markets, for example, livestock or vegetable markets, 
farmers usually need credit supplied by banking institutions. A loan contract usually 
requires collateral. In this case, insurance can play the role of a credit guarantee. The 
insurance scheme is helpful for small and vulnerable farmers, not only to compensate for 
yield failures, but also for access to the banking system. The credibility of the insurance 
scheme certainly facilitates farmers’ access to prosperous markets.
The central government budget for the AMR Scheme was approximately ¥ 88 billion
in 2017 (Table 7). About 56 percent is allocated to premium subsidies in recent years, and 
the rest goes to operational costs of the scheme. The government’s share of premium is, in 
principle, 50 percent of the total premium. The budget of AMRAs and federations was 
¥99.4 billion in 2015, and 38.6 percent was subsidized by the government. The manpower 
cost of AMRA staff was 58.6 percent of the AMRAs’ budgets. The cost of damage 
assessment was only ¥2.1 billion (2.1 percent).
Through the annual activities of the scheme, the central government can reserve the 
residual of the scheme (Table 8). The residual is earmarked as the reinsurance special 
account. The special account cannot be expanded, but is spent the next year as part of 
source for the re-reinsurance fund.
The central government is now reforming the Scheme toward income insurance 
instead of yield insurance. This may mitigate the impact of price changes on members 
under free trade and globalization. The reform can be expected to extend the insurance 
items covered, and to reduce the cost of various transactions, as well as the manpower 
required for the AMRAs. The Scheme plans to utilize declared income, recorded on the
blue form for income tax (Aoiro Shinkoku) to assess the damages resulting from an income 
decrease. Farmers are obligated to become “blue return taxpayers.” In Japan, there has been 
Table7. Budget for the AMR Scheme Implementation
(million yen)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2017(%)
AMR Budget Total 91,103 89,345 89,199 89,136 89,023 88,589 88,235 (100%)
Government share of 
Premium (/ indemnity ) 
50,110 50,110 50,110 50,110 50,110 50,110 50,110 (56.8%)
Operational cost of AMR 40,285 38,685 38,585 38,525 38,425 38,025 37,689 (42.7%)
Source: MAFF 2017
Note: Budget expense based on the Agricultural Disaster Compensation Law (Law No.185 of 1947). The government 
share of premium is, in principle, 50% of total premium.
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a “Kuroyon Problem” (9-6-4: Ku-ro-yon) problem. It has been said that the tax office can 
capture about 90 percent of office workers’ income and 60 percent of self-employed 
businesses, but only 40 percent of farmers’ income. Linking with the blue declaration form 
for income tax, the AMR Scheme is expected to secure a more precise damage assessment 
with less manpower and management cost. Changing the mode of operation from yield 
based to income based is achievable along with improvement of the tax collection system. 
VI. Summary and Implication of the AMR Scheme
Various features of the AMR (NOSAI) Scheme of Japan could be worthy of 
consideration for further development of an agricultural insurance scheme in developing 
countries of Asia. Japan’s experience is summarized in the following five points.
First, the architecture of the Scheme is basically as follows: it is operated based on the 
self-reliance of the association members, and is financially guaranteed by a multilayered
risk dispersion mechanism; the premium payment for the Scheme is shared by member
farmers and the central government subsidy; this enables the Scheme to compel AMR
members to participate in the insurance program for rice, wheat, and barley to ensure food
security. 
Second, the organization that operates the AMR Scheme is composed of municipality
level associations, municipalities, prefectural level federations, and the national level 
association. This makes frequent and close contact with each level of government and 
sustains the reinsurance mechanism. The central government can precisely monitor 
operations at each level and collect reliable information.
Third, there are many options for insurance methods, insured levels, and program
items. The AMR member farmers have some room to select the options themselves,
although it is partially compulsory. Peer monitoring and the self-reliance principle is 
strengthened by the close collaboration between the association and the government. 
Fourth, these features mentioned above enable farmer members and their association 
to retain ownership of the scheme. Farmers are not just like clients of the insurance 
business, and an insurance association does not operate just as an administrative instrument
Table 8. Revenue and Expenditure of the Central Government: Reinsurance Special Account
(Unit: million yen)
Program Account 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Cumulative 
total for fiscal
1947 to 2007
Agriculture: Rice and 
the other grain 
32,368 27,622 -58,277 -2,709 22,870 10,596 19,993 62,339
Livestock 1,353 331 257 512 2,280 -129 1,995 34,740
Fruits and Fruit-trees 1,844 2,483 1,263 -3,503 2,580 1,057 1,528 -31,741
Green house 1,193 714 874 -3,182 649 808 1,174 15,661
Total 36,758 31,150 -55,883 -8,883 28,379 12,331 24,690 80,999
Source: NOSAI Japan
http://www.nosai.or.jp/nosai_kasou/nosai_eng_07.html 
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to disburse government subsidies. Various players of the Scheme at each level, including
governments and the mutual relationship among them, have promoted the formation of an 
“agricultural insurance pool.” This has contributed to the operation of the AMR Scheme for 
70 years.
Fifth, a mechanism for reducing moral hazard and adverse selection needs to be built 
into its architecture, organization, and various policy options. Measuring reduction of moral 
hazard and adverse selection is hard, but it can be expected that the mechanism ultimately 
enables reduction of the cost of operating the insurance scheme, and helps realize 
sustainable operations. Special attention must be paid to the accountability and 
responsibility of the members and associations. A group of farmers is allowed to join as a 
member of the insurance association, but the group must be a legal body or at least 
qualified by its written mandate in the AMR Scheme. The insurance scheme is not a sort of 
project with a limited period. It must be operated not by voluntary groups, but by going 
concerns which are legally mandated.
As for implications for developing countries in monsoon Asia?, the following points 
extracted from the experience of Japan are worthwhile.
Forming an insurance association could be an effective institutional reform to facilitate
farmers’ participation in an insurance scheme and to create a substantive food security 
system. The insurance association as a substance of mutual relief under the AMR Scheme 
in Japan has realized the farmers’ participation and established the ownership of the scheme.
This can contribute to reduce the cost of monitoring various risks and damage assessment
by mobilizing sufficient manpower of association members. The AMR Scheme is not just a 
disbursement mechanism of the central government subsidy for agricultural insurance.
Agricultural insurance in monsoon Asia can be effectively operated not by farmers as 
clients of insurance program but by farmers’ participation with their ownership through 
mutual relief. Mutual relief can be expected to solve the problem of low participation of
farmers to agricultural insurance scheme in monsoon Asia.
Various resources such as extension workers, facilitators for rural development, 
various governmental services through village administration and rural financial institutions 
have been injected into rural communities, for example, in Indonesia. If these resources or
institutions are well organized and linked, they can be mobilized toward creating and 
operating an “agricultural insurance pool” as a risk aggregator and sustainable reinsurance 
mechanism. A mutual relief association could be the core of this pool. This pool is expected 
to reduce the redundant efforts of development and realize an effective and resilient
insurance scheme. This can be a development effort along with solving “the middle income 
trap.”
The commitment of local (village or municipality) governments is necessary to 
establish and support the mutual relief association. A grass roots “agricultural insurance 
pool” involving local governments can operate effectively and be resilient. The
commitment of local governments may by itself contribute to their capacity building and 
improving governance in a practical manner.
During the last quarter century, Japan has experienced large and severe disasters which 
could be regarded as systemic turmoil. The AMR Scheme is often criticized because of its 
large annual budget expense; however, the Scheme endured and responsibly afforded the
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disbursement of insurance and reinsurance even in a severe disaster year. The Scheme 
shows the resilience backed by the determined and foursquare policy for food security.
Severe disasters will be repeated in the future in monsoon Asia countries. As typhoons,
cyclones, El Nino, and other broad scale severe disasters can hit people in the region,
agricultural insurance needs to be ensured by the determined and foursquare policy for food 
security like Japan. Without such ultimately secured system, agricultural insurance cannot
realize the wider participation of farmers as well as their ownership about the scheme.
This study pays special attention on a role of insurance that links farmers to modern 
supply chains, for example, higher-value urban markets and overseas markets, in the 
commercialization of agriculture and globalization, such the establishment of economic 
partnership frameworks as the AEC in Southeast Asia. Given the rapid commercialization 
of agriculture, the subsectors of vegetables and livestock tend to seek out new urban city 
markets or overseas markets where business risks are high. If farmers cannot make the 
shipping weight and quality of crops set by the contract, they could be charged penalties.
An agricultural insurance scheme can mitigate such risks and avoid the collapse of the 
relationship of mutual trust, particularly when farmers or small rural traders encounter
defaults caused by severe disasters. In this sense, an agricultural insurance scheme needs to 
be designed to facilitate activities in progressive markets by linking them with the financial
system. Agricultural insurance assured by farmers’ participation and ownership and the 
foursquare policy for food security under good governance is also essential to ensure the 
business continuity in monsoon Asian counties.
End Notes
1. This paragraph and the following paragraphs primarily rely on the explanation on the
NOSAI homepage.
2. Potato, soybean, red bean, butter bean (haricot), sugar beet, sugar cane, tea (first reaping), 
buckwheat, sweetcorn, onions, pumpkin, sericulture (cocoon).
3. Dairy cow, grazing cow, horse, breeding pig, fattening pig.
4. Oranges, apple, pear, grape, persimmon, chestnut, ume plum, plum, loquat, peach, kiwi, 
pineapple.
5. Mahul and Stutley refer to insurance pool mainly as the pool of capital, but in this paper 
pool has much wider meaning and includes social capital. The pool comprises of central 
and local governments, local communities, people and mutual relations among them. 
These could have latent capacity to drive forward the capacity development and human 
resource development for establishing and operating agricultural insurance scheme. This 
pool can be expected to facilitate the improvement of risk information, risk awareness, 
insurance culture and regulatory framework.
6. Cattle and horses can be compulsory when a farmer becomes a policy holder of the rice, 
wheat and barley program and the association decides that participation is compulsory.
7. In the case of paddy, the average insurance rate was 0.44% (= (0.005/0.571)/2=0.0044). 
At the initial stage of rice insurance in Indonesia in 2015 and 2016, for example, the 
insurance rate was nominally 3% but the farmer’s actual rate was 0.6%. Its 80%, namely 
2.4%, was subsidized by the government. Indonesia seems to have drawn upon the case 
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of Japan when it launched rice insurance scheme. But the rate was nearly 40% higher 
than that of Japan, although the participation was not compulsory in Indonesia. This 
higher rate could be a reason why the rice insurance scheme in Indonesia still cannot 
gain popularity. This insurance rate (calculated by the Damage Rate over the Loss Ratio)
is considered to be a certain reference that implies the feasibility, sustainability or 
farmers’ acceptancy of the insurance scheme.
8. Pasaribu’s paper is of reference to understand the recent development of agricultural 
insurance in Indonesia where an agricultural insurance for paddy farming has been 
implemented since 2014 (Pasaribu, 2014).
References
Dian A.A.E.; H. Yonekura; and N. Takashino (2013). “Adoption and Sustainability of New 
Technologies: A Case Study of Integrated Coffee-Goat Farming in Bali.” Journal of 
Rural Society and Economics, 31(1), pp.39-45.
FAO (2011). Agricultural Insurance in Asia and the Pacific region. Bangkok: FAO (Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations).
Indri N. and K. Ishii (2017). “Limiting Condition for Adopting New Variety of Pineapple: A 
Case Study of Agricultural Development Program in Kediri District.” Journal of 
Farm Management Economics (48), pp.40-51.
MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) (2017). “Outline of the Ongoing 
Scheme of the Agricultural Disaster Compensation (NOSAI).” In Japanese. Tokyo: 
MAFF.
Mahul, O. and C.J. Stutley (2010).  Government Support to Agricultural Insurance.
Washington D.C.: World Bank.
NOSAI Homepage http://nosai.or.jp/nosai_kasou/nosai_eng_04.html and others.
Okada, F. (2016). “Sustainable Growth in Crop Natural Disaster Insurance: Experiences of 
Japan.” FFTC Agricultural Policy Articles, Agricultural risk management.
http://ap.fftc.agnet.org/ap_db.php?id=643&print=1.
Pasaribu, S.M. (2014). “Penerapan Asuransi Pertanian di Indonesia.” In Haryono (edt.) 
Reformasi Kebijakan Menuju Transformasi Pembangunan Pertanian. Jakarta: 
IAARD Press, pp.491-514. 
Reyes, C.M; A.D. Agbon; C.D. Mina; and R.A.B. Gloria1 (2017). “Agricultural Insurance 
Program: Lessons from Different Country Experiences.” Discussion Paper Series 
NO. 2017-02, Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
World Bank (2008). World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development.
Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Acknowledgement
The author is deeply grateful to anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and 
helpful suggestions. This paper is based on the author’s keynote speech presented at the 
International Conference of ISAE (Indonesian Society of Agricultural Economics) held in 
Bali on 24 August 2017. 
－19－
Hitoshi YONEKURA 
Appendix 1. Records of Agricultural Insurance in 2015 
 
Source: MFAA
Insured
(‘000 
household)
Insured
Area/ Head
(‘000ha/
’000head)
Share of 
insuring
(%: area / 
head-count 
base)
Total 
amounts of
insurance
(‘00 million 
yen)
Premiums (’00 million yen)
Total Governmentpaid
Farmers
paid
Rice, wheat and 
barley insurance
Paddy rice 1,442 1,463 92.3 10,157 93 47 47
Upland rice 0.1 01 5.1 0.2 0.02 0.01 0.01
Wheat and 
barley 44 268 97.7 1,101 104 55 48
Total 1,486 1,731 11,258 197 102 95
Livestock 
insurance
Dairy cattle 15 2,156 92.5 3,001 366 180 186
Beef cattle 45 2,185 67.1 3,674 187 87 100
Horse 2 21 60.2 201 7.0 3.0 4.0
Breeding pig 0.8 201 24.4 98 3.0 1.0 2.0
Fatting pig 0.6 1,825 24.6 203 18 7.0 11.0
Total 63 6,388 7,177 581 278 303
Fruit and fruit-tree 
insurance
Fruits 61 38 24.2 967 43 22 22
Fruit-tree 2 1.0 3.4 52 0.5 0.3 0.3
Total 63 39 1,019 44 22 22
Upland crops 
insurance
Crops 74 289 70.0 1,996 129 71 58
Silk-cocoon 0.2
(‘000 box)
2.6 14.1 1 0.03 0.01 0.01
Total 74 ----- ----- 1,997 129 71 58
Greenhouse insurance 208 23 6,667 64 31 33
Total 1896 ----- ----- 28,119 1,014 504 510
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Appendix 2. Indemnities of Agricultural Insurance in 2015
The number of 
damaged 
farmers
(‘000 farmers/
heads, 
contracts)
Indemnities
(million 
yen)
Reinsurance: 
Indemnities 
subsidized by 
the 
government
(million yen)
Loss Ratio
(Indemnity/
Premium) 
Damage 
Rate
( Indemnity/ 
Insurance)
(%)
Premium
Paid by 
Farmers
(Average/10a,
head, box, or 
house) 
Rice, wheat 
and barley 
insurance
Paddy rice 51 5,306 1,065 0.571 0.5 636
Upland rice 0.03 3 1 1.500 15.0 na
Wheat and barley 15 2,833 92 0.272 2.6 3868
Total 66 8,142 1,158 0.413 0.7
Livestock 
insurance
Life
insurance
(thousand 
heads)
Dairy cattle 149 18,611 9,305 0.978 11.9 16,992
Beef cattle 58 7,404 3,710 0.923 4.7 8,544
Horse 1 461 230 0.961 3.3 na
Breeding pig 4 196 98 0.820 2.5 943
Fatting pig 173 1,489 745 0.827 7.3 974
Total 385 28,161 14,088 0.955 7.7
Health
insurance
(thousand 
contract)
Dairy cattle 1,323 17,182 3,511 * * *
Beef cattle 1,051 9,860 1,857 * * *
Horse 14 212 33 * * *
Breeding pig 7 50 10 * * *
Fatting pig -- -- -- * * *
Total 2,395 27,304 5,411
Fruit and 
fruit-tree 
insurance
Fruits 16 4,928 2,452 1.146 5.1
Apple fruits 
7,110
Fruit-tree 0.2 48 1 0.960 0.9
Total 16 4,976 2,453 1.131 4.9
Upland 
crops 
insurance
Field crops 21 5,219 2,015 0.405 2.6
Potato
2,364
Sericulture 0.02 1.5 0.5 0.500 1.5 1,008
total 21 5,220 2,016 0.405 2.6
Greenhouse insurance 
(‘000 houses) 27 3,316 511 0.518 0.5
Glass 9,497
Plastic 7,457
Total -- 77,119 25,637 0.761 2.7
Source: MAFF and author’s processing.
Note *: Health insurance for livestock is combined with life insurance for livestock.
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